Kim Jong Il visits China

Shortly after the failed currency reforms, I last talked about how North Korea was in danger of collapse and wondered what would happen when Kim Jong Il shortly visits China. Well, Kim Jong Il is in China now and this time North Korea apparently blew up a South Korean ship.

There seems to be mounting evidence that North Korea recently blew up a South Korean ship (and no, I don't believe that North Korea blew up the BP oil rig from Cuba for a second). But, what is particularly interesting is what is going on in China and to see what, if anything, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il can extract from China this time.  In particular, it'd be interesting to see:

1)How China addresses the Cheonan incident, if at all. In particular, whether South Korea takes this incident to the UNSC for token sanctions, which would, again, require China to side against North Korea. The last time China did this it cost the Chinese $2.1 billion in aid, a visit by a high ranking Chinese communist official, and the prestige from hosting six-party talks.

And, in particular,

2)What type of additional aid North Korea receives from China, if any -- such as investment.

As it has become clear for a while now that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons program, what will China now do? As South Korea and the United States will not provide aid, it puts South Korea in particular at risk of pushing North Korea into China's camp. But, with North Korea allegedly blowing up the South Korean ship, Cheonan, it will be intereseting to see what happens from this point on. I mean it was interesting enough to see that the Chinese President Hu Jintao met with South Korea President Lee Myung Bak just a few days before Kim Jong Il's first visit to China since 2006. But, will China strain relations with South Korea and be seen as a supporter of yet another rogue (I'd itching to use the word "terrorist" here) nation for the sake of stability? A lot has changed for China since 1998 when they last bailed out North Korea -- the country has joined the WTO, hosted the Olympics, and is set to be the second largest economy in the world, if it isn't already. It seems that the trilateral alignment that Scott Snyder mentions in China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security that is necessary to actually coordinate an effective policy might indeed already be underway and that the end of the DPRK might indeed not be that far off.

On a side note, I'd like to clarify so that everyone understands that North Korea was taken off the terrorist list not because the United States believed that North Korea wasn't a state sponsoring terrorism, but that the previous administration did so just to see if, well, let's give them everything they want and see if they'll give up their nukes -- which they didn't. And, the Obama administration is picking up right, where the last administration left off with an approrpiate definition of  the word "engagement."

As for North Korea being a terrorist state, let's see...
state sponsored manufacturing of illicit substances, counterfeit U.S. dollar bills, torture, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology (i.e. Syria), ballistic missiles (i.e. Yemen, Iran(Shahab-3)), kidnapping civilians from foreign soil or waters (Japan, South Korea), blowing up foreign airliners (Korean Airlines flight in 1987 to name one), shooting a South Korean civilian (Mount Geumgang), allowing terrorist organizations to take refuge in the country (Japan's Red Army faction back), etc...

So, what's going on in North Korea these days?

Although North Korea's recent currency reform debacle is showing the world how far the DPRK government has fallen, it also seems that at the same time the Do Not Let North Korea Fail at all costs idea I have been writing about up until now may no longer be applicable. Especially as media coverage on the DPRK's food situation seems to be rather sparse -- or at the very least given little attention, my guess is that the United States and South Korea have all, but given up on negotiating with North Korea and are waiting to see what happens when Kim Jong Il dies. And, while China seems to have come through on aid after the implementation of the most recent round of sanctions, these sanctions do seem to be working and I believe the U.S. estimates that arm sales by North Korea have dropped in half. Plus, as there is no longer a lifeline from South Korea as under the previous two South Korean administrations (consider the threat by North Korea to seize South Korean assets in the DPRK), it finally seems the powers that be have all agreed to finally strangle stop subsidizing Kim Jong Il's regime. It will be interesting to see how this plays out, but we can get a rough glimpse at how North Koreans may perceive their government by looking at studies that have been coming out ever since the end of the famine and how much control the DPRK government retains over its people.

In particular, consider the study, "Political Attitudes under Repression: Evidence from North Korean Refugees" by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland (The pdf file is free). This was published just this month and is at the cutting edge of what is known about how North Koreans may feel about their government. I would at the very least read through the introduction and look at the nice graphs.  Even though the study is at the cutting edge of what is currently known, consider that one of the aspects of the study was to see if North Koreans make jokes about the government or Kim Jong Il -- I believe in order to see how much control the government still has over its people. These views had to be extrapolated out of representative samples of North Koreans living outside of the country. This goes to show how little information on North Korea has been available in the past and even with large numbers of North Koreans leaving their country recently, how little is still actually known about North Korea.

Unlike their earlier studies, such as, "Exit Polls: Refugee Assessments of North Korea's transition," this study focused more on changing views of North Koreans' government in the past decade or so (again, it highlights how much more information on North Korea has become available in the aftermath of the famine).

The study tries to address what North Koreans thought were the best paths at social mobility in terms of "getting ahead" or "making money." The study suggests a picture of a government that is widely thought to be corrupt  -- the study shows becoming a government official or a party member as the best way to get ahead and engaging in market, corrupt, or criminal activity as the best way to make money (working hard at assigned task looks to be at zero percent). Also, of note is that the study suggests the vast majority of North Koreans blame failed DPRK policies for their economic plight and, unsurprisingly, zero percent to global economic factors.

However, while the study again showed economic reasons as the primary reason for leaving North Korea, also of note is that in the study's samples 1% cited religious freedom to be their primary motive for leaving. Combining this with their earilier work that show a similarly low figure leaving North Korea primarily due to the assistance of NGOs, I wonder how effective NGOs truly are -- as most are led by religious movements.

So, perhaps, it's a good bet to see if the DPRK will manage to survive another -- revolutionary -- hereditary succession.

North Korea Update Cont'd: Mobile Phones

On Another Front:

The Chosun Ilbo reports that:

"About 48,000 North Koreans had by the end of June subscribed to the mobile phone service that started in the North last December, VOAreported Wednesday quoting data released by the service operator.

Orascom, the Egyptian telecom firm that runs it, plans to expand the service area from Pyongyang to the whole of North Korea by the end of this year, VOA said. The operator is poised to start HSPA service at the request of foreigners in North Korea who need to use wireless high-speed internet there, the report said.

Currently, officials of the North Korean Workers' Party or the government are reportedly banned from using mobile phones for security reasons. Ordinary North Korean residents, whose monthly pay is about 4,000 North Korean won (aroundUS$30), cannot afford the service due to the high price of handsets, which cost at US$300-500, and the subscription fee" ("Some 50,000 N. Koreans Use Mobile Phones" : Chosun Ilbo)

So, I'm confused. There can't possibly be 48,000 diplomats and Kim Jong Il possibly can't have 48,000 children, then who are using all those mobile phones? The article mentions that members of the North Korean Workers Party (조선로동당) aren't allowed to use mobile phones and it's targeted for foreigners. But, 48,000 foreigners; that'd be a lot of people. So, could it be the 48,000 people are actually members of the Korean People's Army (조선인민군)?

North Korea Update: Relentless Scolding (잔소리) and the State of the Six Party Talks

While this is a blog that pays attention to both North and South Korea, I haven't made it much of a habit of following, tracking, and commenting on each individual bit of news as it comes out. And, I don't intend to unless there is something at least somewhat meaningful going on, such as the summit in Washington a couple months ago. At any rate none of the "stories" that have been coming out have really been all that important.

Since the missle tests on July 4th, North Korea has allegedly launched "Distributed Denial-Of-Service" or Attacks over the Internet on South Korean and U.S. governmental websites. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) have blamed North Korea, more specifically:

"It told lawmakers in a closed-door briefing Friday that a North Korean military research centre called 'Number 110' seems to have orchestrated the attacks, according to Yonhap news agency" (South Korea downgrades cyber attack alert AFP).

This is a complete non-issue as it pales in comparison to the attacks that take place on sites that refute South Korea's territorial claims on Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo, Takeshima, 독도, 獨島, 竹島) or a site refusing to give equal weight to the name East Sea as to that given to the Sea of Japan. Usually, these attacks come from regular, angry South Korean "netizens" -- by the way, I've always found netizens to be such a Korean-English word as whenever I hear it, it just reminds me of the English I would read in Korean newspapers. So, basically, the sophistication of these attacks is really no higher than hitting the refersh button over and over and over again. Cyberattacks from North Korea? C'mon now. It'll take much more than that for the United States to take North Korea seriously and give them one-on-one talks (By the way, whatever happened to Obama's pledge for one-on-one talks with any dictator?)

"Ruling out any direct talks with North Korea on nuclear disarmament negotiations, the US today said Pyongyang can only be engaged multilaterally through the six-party mechanism" ("US rules out any direct talks with North Korea" : Business Standard).

For, you see, I think North Korea does not very much like these six-party talks as it's basically like a situation when say I'm just interested in what just one particular person has to say, but there are these other people who have something to say to you as well (잔소리/Scolding from so many parties). On the other hand, from China's perspective, each round of its successful hosting shows that China has matured as a responsible power that understands the dangers of North Korean nuclear weapons proliferation and just hosting it shows off the country's power as it shows how China has brought North Korea to the negotiating table. It's mere hosting is seen as a success for China.

For the United States, it's a way to deflect responsibility or rather, a way to ensure that the United States is not the sole party responsible to denuclearize North Korea. Japan's foreign policy with respect to North Korea is held hostage to its very loud and powerful ultraconservative wing of the LDP as the forum has been the main and only one for Japan to express discontent at North Korea for not talking more about hostages (Even as recently, a group of South Korean fisherman have been taken into North Korean custody and a South Korean worker at Gaeseong still remains in North Korean custody). Yet, South Korea too, shows how it's a responsible party by placing sanctions on North Korea at least on a nominal basis and even having recently joined the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative).

Then, only after having to hear all these things that these people (countries) have to say about your behavior and only then, can you finally get to hear what the United States (the only person you're interested in) has to say.

So, you can see the reasoning behind why:

"North Korea has said the purpose of the six-nation talks was to 'disarm and incapacitate' it"("North Korea Asserts New Willingness to Talk" : New York Times).

On a personal note, I'm surprised that North Korea hasn't done more to garner more U.S. attention and lets hope that this august will be a quiet august.