A planned visit to South Korea. What does North Korea's attack on Yeonpyeong Island mean? rev 1

Dec.23.10 - Part 1, draft

I plan on visiting South Korea for a month or so in the new year, contingent on my schedule for 2011. I find news of North Korea's attack on Yeonpyeong Island to be quite shocking and the numerous number of protests that followed the provocative act.  After North Korea's attack on Yeonpyeong Island, this was then followed by a number of demonstrations that were either targeted against North Korea or South Korea's response for being too forceful.I would like to get a first hand impression of how things are/ in South Korea in late spring of the new year.

The United States finally sent the U.S.S. George Washington to the Yellow Sea in live fire exercises. This was not followed by another North Korean response by North Korea's military, but rather hideous claims by North Korea re-inviting inspectors to suspected sites in North Korea's nuclear weapons program and of the existence of a nuclear weapons program not unlike that of Pakistan or Iran (parallel uranium enrichment program).

I lived in South Korea in 2001 - 2005 and I cannot imagine how South Korea could be now. The years I was there were memorable for its livid Anti-American protests.

I had earlier thought that in the wake of the deployment of the USS George Washington that another North Korean act of aggression in the 2010 calendar year to just not be possible out of North Korea's fear over a China angry that there happened to be a U.S. nuclear powered aircraft carrier off  the waters that surround Beijing and Shanghai. Furthermore, the sinking of the ROKN Cheonan brought forward a (weakly worded) UNSC statement and large joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea in both the waters west and east off the Korean peninsula.

However, this was then followed in November with a North Korean attack on South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island, which happens to be located in the Yellow Sea. North Korea then announced that the country welcomes back inspectors to suspected sites for its nuclear weapons program and also happily announced an existence of a parallel, uranium enrichment program. 

This finally brought the USS George Washington off the waters of the heart of China and an easy way to bring forward thoughts that criticize China -- such as the AEI's proclamation of concern for North Korean aggression.

To finally bring the USS George Washington to the Yellow Sea as well as provide the AEI or organizations that lack any genuine interest over North Korea to use the country as a convenient method to attack China -- by attacking North Korea, the attacker could bring to attention how useless and ineffective Chinese leadership in the region is. Almost as in a textbook example, China protects North Korea out of concern for her provinces that border North Korea and North Korea responds by selling out China in order to gain a security guarantee from a power that rivals China. 

With a transition in North Korea leadership still in progress and this being situated next to promises by South Korea's Lee Myung Bak Administration for a more forceful response to future North Korean acts of provocation, it might be too early to say these events will be followed by a long period of silence. This should in no way lead to absolute fabrication of heightened tensions resulting from President Lee Myung Bak's policy toward North Korea being too aggressive towards fascist North Korea.

This is a political environment that I'd like to see first hand.

Doubts about how North Korea was lost to China VERIFIED...

draft: 12/21
Back in September I posted against Aiden Foster Carter's (a senior research fellow of Modern Korea at Leeds University) view that influence over North Korea is prized over that over South Korea -- a slightly more academic version of a political view that embraced the Sunshine Policy.

In August China loudly complained against the proposed deployment of the largest aircraft carrier in the world -- the U.S.S. George Washington --  in the Yellow Sea. The United States minded these concerns when China had just condoned North Korea's sinking of the South Korea's Cheonan by deploying the U.S.S. George Washington off the eastern coast of the Korean peninsula rather than off the western coast.

I earlier bet that:

Consider that as a result of the Cheonan fiasco -- from none other than a Sinocentric point of view --  the huge cost for China has been South Korea. I would think the ultimate end game for China  -- again from a Sinocentric point of view -- is to dominate East Asia, which includes kicking out or splintering the U.S.-Japan and U.S-ROK alliances and unifying with Taiwan. The end game for China is not about paying for North Korean food, roads, and ports and extracting natural resources that North Korea may have. The real gold is elsewhere.

I'd bet that North Korea surely sees this too and would love at any cost to get the United States to guarantee the security of the country any day over the Chinese. In the meantime, China will continue to feed North Korea, build North Korean roads and ports, and bring the northern half of the peninsula out of the dark ages all of which North Korea will not be grateful for. After all, China is doing this for self-serving reasons. 

And, now it seems quite clear that North Korea on the flip side would rather transfer Chinese aid in exchange for a grand bargain with the United States.

Joshua Stanton:

Lastly:

Most political analysts in Seoul said the most likely scenario was that the North had decided to bide its time while waiting to see whether its attack last month would pressure South Korea and the United States into talks, and possibly even concessions. They said this was a recurring pattern in the North’s unique brand of brinkmanship: making a provocation in hopes of forcing the other side to the bargaining table.

China was rewarded with a November deployment of the U.S.S. George Washington in the Yellow Sea after North Korea attacked South Korean troops deployed in Yeonpyong Island in the Yellow Sea. Influence over North Korea doesn't seem to be much of a blessing. Doubts about how North Korea was lost to China VERIFIED.

By the way, I did suppose that there wouldn't be another North Korean act of provocation, but more on that later...

Thanksgiving

rough draft Oct/27/10
edit: Dec/21/10 - corrected link to previous post criticizing Aiden Foster-Carter's paper...

After receiving surgery a couple weeks ago, I've been in a hospital with another surgery being scheduled for one in another couple weeks. As my stay  has continued to grow longer, the stay has proved to be quite positive in the sense of recovering from surgery. At the same time though, I've noticed the hospital also functions as a shield in that it has kept me from reading news articles (no Internet) or watching televised news articles. (no television in rooms). However, I've been approached a couple times about the possibility of war breaking due to the recent North Korean attack on a South Korean controlled island.This has out in Korea and it has drawn me to write this post in the nurses computers as I try to compute what the possibility of war will be.

 To get an understanding of why North Korea has done this, it's important not to forget that North Korea has named Kim Jong Il's youngest son in a position of authority. With Kim Jong Il still, alive, the possibility of war is zero and the most recent action to attack South Koreans functions to display how weak the North Korean-Chinese alliance is.

In this context, North Korea attacked South Korean forces largely to illustrate that even with Kim Jong Il's terrible health, North Korea is still run by a powerful, centralized government. This is a highly important issue when looking for the primary goals for North Korea deciding to attack South Koreans.

I earlier wrote against the principle that China won a prize by having North Korean support and it seems China is losing more than it gains by "allying" with North Korea.

The Economist has a recent article that binds the recent DPRK attack within this context of China actually losing out by North Koean agression:

China cannot be blind to the Kims’ bungling and bellicosity, nor welcome their nuclear ambitions. But it has had two worse fears. One is of a rekindled war on the peninsula, which would damage China. The other is of North Korean collapse, with millions of desperate refugees pouring into China and South Korea or even American troops on China’s border. It is as a bulwark against this “instability” that China cossets the Kims. It refused to condemn them even for the sinking of the Cheonan, and this week issued blandly even-handed calls for restraint. It apparently believes that if their only ally abandons them, the Kims might do something really rash.

To assess the value of this action by North Korea, all we need to do is consider that the purpose of these attacks are to suggest that even when Kim Jong Il passes away, the government is strong and led by his brother-in-law/sister, and his 27 year old son. News coverage that asks the average joe what the chances of war will be after the North Korean attack is proves to a positive consequence for North Korea attacking South Korea.Of course, if the average joe answers that chances of war are still almost zero, then the miliary attack happened to be a failure for all countries in the region.

p.s. I've been very sick for the past couple months and I've been unable to post on this webblog until, well, I was driven to post on this topic. But, me being sick, does not get me to start concluding that there will be war in Northeast Asia. It does hint that future elections will be won by SKorean politicians siting to the right of center - GNP/Han Nara Dang)

Chrisian Sciene Monitor:---------------After North Korean attack, South Korean island empties out

After North Korean artillery showered this island in the Yellow Sea Tuesday, locals say they're fearful of North Korea's latest threats of a peninsula 'on the brink of war.'

Police officers patrol near houses destroyed by a North Korean attack on the Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea, Friday. Yeonpyeong is evacuating its 1,700 residents after North Korea said they were on the 'brink of war.'

(rough draft )

Doubts about "How North Korea was lost - to China"

Add/Update: For clarity. Sept. 20th, '10

There's an interesting article here that looks at how Seoul and Washington "lost" North Korea;  I don't find it very agreeable

North Korea Economy Watch:

Aiden Foster-Carter has written an long piece in the Asia Times on North Korea’s geopolitics.  It is a fairly long piece, so here is the punch line:

So there’s our winner. Its rivals’ missteps have helped, but Beijing has long played a skillful, patient game. Like Moscow, it irked the North by recognizing South Korea (in 1992), but unlike the abrupt Russians it worked hard to soothe sensitivities.

Eighteen years on, guess which power is the top trade partner of both Koreas? Now, there’s subtle hegemony for you. No prizes either for guessing who’s snapping up North Korea’s mines, and beginning the lengthy, costly process of modernizing its decrepit infrastructure.

Face it: who else has the motive, or the means? As all agree, China’s overriding worry about North Korea is not Kim’s nukes but fear of collapse, and the chaos this could cause on its own borders. Beijing’s consistent strategy is not to paint Kim into a corner, no matter what.

Knowing that, how did policymakers in Seoul or Washington delude themselves that China would hurry to join a chorus of condemnation over the Cheonan? No way. Beijing squirmed a bit, but the game was worth the candle. Let Washington and Seoul huff and puff. All that achieved was to push an ever-more isolated North Korea further into China’s orbit and influence.

Nothing is certain, especially about North Korea where forecasts (this writer’s not least) have a habit of turning out wrong. I expected North Korea to collapse long ago: guilty as charged, m’lud. I understimated this tough regime’s staying power, or the horrors it would impose on its people – including famine – to cling to power while refusing to see sense.

But this can’t go on forever. The old game of militant mendicancy is finally up. Kim Jong-il’s frail health, a delicate succession, and an empty treasury – United Nations sanctions have hit arms exports, and crime doesn’t pay like it used to – make defying the entire world just too risky.

North Korea needs a sugar daddy. There is only one candidate left standing, and one who fits the bill perfectly. It may not be a marriage made in heaven, mind you. Pyongyang will keep squawking, and even try the old game of playing off its interlocutors – as in its latest thaw with Seoul.

But at the end of the day Beijing is making an offer no one else can match, and which North Korea can’t refuse. It goes roughly like this: Okay, we’ll bail you out, we’ll guarantee your security, we’ll even stomach your weird monarchical tendencies – unless the kid turns out to be a complete klutz, in which case you know what to do. Jang Song-taek (brother-in-law to Kim Jong-il) knows the score.

You can count on us too not to shame you by spelling all this out and giving the game away. But yes, we do need something in return. Two things. First: markets. For goodness sake just leave them alone, nay let ‘em rip – as we’ve been telling you to, ever since Deng Xiaoping.

Look where we are now, and where you are. We’ll do the heavy lifting of investment, so you have functioning factories and railways again. But you have to let it happen. No going back.

Second: no more trouble. We know it may take time for you to give up your footling pesky nukes. But we need an absolute guarantee of no more tests, or else. No other provocations, either. Our People’s Liberation Army will teach your Korean People’s Army how to adapt and how to make money. The new North Korea will be a good global citizen, trading like we do. The returns are good. It beats mugging any day.

And guess what? You’ll love it, all of you. You’ll prosper. No more worries. Your people will eat; your elite will make money. What’s not to like? Just stop all that shouting and marching; what a relief, eh? The rest of the cult can stay, if you must. All hail the young general Kim Jong-eun, finally fulfilling grandpa’s dream of peace and prosperity for all! (With a bit of help from his friends, but we’re modest.) You’ll love him. You really will.
This seems to me a plausible scenario for North Korea’s future. In fact, I struggle to imagine any other. Korean reunification? Maybe in the very long run – but right now, who wants it?

Not the North, whose elite know the fate of their East German counterparts after unification. Can we really expect them to put their faith in the tender mercies of Lee Myung-bak? Even under Kim Dae-jung or Roh Moo-hyun it would have been tricky. What place would there be for most of them, frankly, in a reunified peninsula? Not a privileged one, that’s for sure.

Ordinary North Koreans, too, have learned, from the trickle who have made it to Seoul, that South Korea is no land of milk and honey. True, they’d like a life, and to eat. But China, or a North Korea open to and learning from China, might look a better bet on that score.

Nor is the South enthusiastic, despite all the rhetoric. It would be embarrassing and galling to see the North become a Chinese satellite – yet perhaps also a huge relief. Let Beijing bear the brunt, the burden, and the costs of transforming the madhouse they have long sustained.

Further down the line, blood could prove thicker. By 2040 or so, a by then semi-transformed North Korea may tire of great Han chauvinism, slough off the Chinese yoke, and embrace the cousins south of the demilitarized zone (which would long ago have become more permeable). They’d be easier to absorb, too, now smoothed by a few decades of Chinese-style modernity.

Speculative, to be sure. But what other scenarios are there? And though from one viewpoint China has edged out rival powers as argued above, presumably to their chagrin, might some of them in truth be quietly relieved to be spared the responsibility?

Let China take it on and deliver a new-style North Korea, vibrant and fit for a new century. It could last a long time, and spare the region and world much headache and risk. Does anyone have an alternative?

Aidan Foster-Carter is honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University, and a freelance consultant, writer and broadcaster on Korean affairs. A regular visitor to the peninsula, he has followed North Korea for over 40 years.

In its entirety, Aidan Foster-Carter writes:

Knowing that, how did policymakers in Seoul or Washington delude themselves that China would hurry to join a chorus of condemnation over the Cheonan? No way. Beijing squirmed a bit, but the game was worth the candle. Let Washington and Seoul huff and puff. All that achieved was to push an ever-more isolated North Korea further into China's orbit and influence.

I mean just as much as China likes to make deals with military juntas -- primarily North Korea and Burma,

"But at the end of the day Beijing is making an offer no one else can match, and which North Korea can't refuse."

I think Washington and Seoul expected, well, more from China. 

But, what I'd like to ask is why is China settling on North Korea when the country should be eying South Korea? In the past few months, China has basically pushed Vietnam, South Korea, and, now, Japan to the arms of, well, the United States. 

It's not as if China  has just won a strategic competition against other countries for the great prize that is North Korea. Rather -- and I think many (e.g. Scott Snyder) have argued that this is how North Koreans see it as well. It is not the case of a calculating China defeating the U.S. and the other countries in some grand chess game for influence in North Korea, but rather just a simple case of China looking to gratify its own immediate desire -- "Chinese stability."

Consider that as a result of the Cheonan fiasco -- from none other than a Sinocentric point of view --  the huge cost for China has been South Korea. I would think the ultimate end game for China  -- again from a Sinocentric point of view -- is to dominate East Asia, which includes kicking out or splintering the U.S.-Japan and U.S-ROK alliances and unifying with Taiwan. The end game for China is not about paying for North Korean food, roads, and ports and extracting natural resources that North Korea may have. The real gold is elsewhere.

I'd bet that North Korea surely sees this too and would love at any cost to get the United States to guarantee the security of the country any day over the Chinese. In the meantime, China will continue to feed North Korea, build North Korean roads and ports, and bring the northern half of the peninsula out of the dark ages all of which North Korea will not be grateful for. After all, China is doing this for self-serving reasons.

Add:

This is the logic behind why despite China's growing economic clout over the Korean peninsula  -- China is also Japan's number one trade partner, this has not translated over into political clout.  I  think that this type of reasoning underlying the original article could come to only feed the doubt of those that think South Korea and the United States have become too confrontational with North Korea and think that perhaps reverting back to some form of the now bankrupt Sunshine Policy  may not be that bad of an idea.


Andrew Lankov:

A senior South Korean diplomat described this problem in a private conversation by a good allegory: "China does not have leverage when it comes to dealing with the North. What China has is a hammer."

I would also recommend Scott Snyder's China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security here.